publicaciones seleccionadas

• artículo

  • Priors Rule: When Do Malfeasance Revelations Help Or Hurt Incumbent Parties? 2022
  • Political Competition And State Capacity: Evidence From A Land Allocation Program In Mexico [‘Politics And Economics In Weak And Strong States’], 2022
  • Political Brokers: Partisans or Agents? Evidence from the Mexican Teachers' Union 2017
  • Parties, Brokers, and Voter Mobilization: How Turnout Buying Depends Upon the Party’s Capacity to Monitor Brokers 2016

• documento de trabajo

  • Political Competition and State Capacity: Evidence from a Land Allocation Program in Mexico 2022
  • Political Competition and State Capacity: Evidence from a Land Allocation Program in Mexico 2022
  • Priors Rule: When do Malfeasance Revelations Help and Hurt Incumbent Parties 2022
  • Political Competition and State Capacity Evidence from a Land Allocation Program in Mexico 2020
  • Political Competition and State Capacity: Evidence from a Land Allocation Program in Mexico 2018-08
  • Priors Rule: When do Malfeasance Revelations Help or Hurt Incumbent Parties? 2018-08
  • Political Constraints and State Capacity: Evidence from a Land Allocation Program in Mexico 2015