Encuentre a un experto

Communication Networks in Common-Pool Resource Games: Field Experimental Evidence

Serie

  • Working Papers

Resumen

  • This work explores the role of the communication structures and message types in an artefactual field experiment emulating the open access extraction of a common pool resource. We introduce two network structures that allow participants to transmit non-binding suggestions to the nodes with whom they were connected. In a centralized structure, good (cooperative) recommendations have a positive but temporary effect reducing the aggregate extraction levels, while bad (self-regarding) recommendations have a negative and permanent effect. In a decentralized structure the positive effect of good suggestions is permanent, while bad suggestions do not have any effect on aggregate extraction levels. Although allocation within the network was exogenous, we found a positive correlation between network centrality and other-regarding behavior.

fecha de publicación

  • 2013

Líneas de investigación

  • Artisanal Fishermen
  • Communication
  • Exogenous Social Networks

Issue

  • 201360