An Experimental Analysis of Team Production in Networks

Publicado en

  • Experimental Economics

Resumen

  • Experimental and empirical evidence highlights the role of networks on social outcomes. In this paper we test the properties of exogenously fixed networks in team production. Subjects make the same decisions in a team-work environment under four different organizational networks: The line, the circle, the star, and the complete network. In all the networks, links make information available to neighbors. This design allows us to analyze decisions across networks and a variety of subject’s types in a standard linear team production game. Contribution levels differ significantly across networks and the star is the most efficient incomplete one. Moreover, our results suggest that subjects act as conditional cooperators with respect to the information received from the network.

fecha de publicación

  • 2010

Página inicial

  • 399

Última página

  • 411

Volumen

  • 13

Issue

  • 4