Precarious Democracies, Political Negotiation and Selective Predation

Publicado en

  • Estudios Económicos


  • This paper demonstrates that a precarious democracy is harmful to the poor rather than benefiting them as long as the governing party, being a highly informal organization, includes a cartel of political patrons and business people. The mayor is unable to govern freely due to controls or vetoes exercised by those collective actors to which he/she belongs. Not having been elected democratically, the objective of these groups is to co-opt the state at the subnational level by violating civil rights and liberties on election days and committing crimes against the public administration during the term of government.

fecha de publicación

  • 2015

Líneas de investigación

  • Clientelism
  • Political Negotiation
  • Poverty
  • Precarious Democracies

Página inicial

  • 305

Última página

  • 339


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