Institutions Influence Preferences: Evidence from a Common Pool Resource Experiment


  • Documentos CEDE


  • We model the dynamic effects of external enforcement on the exploitation of a common pool resource. Fitting our model to the results of experimental data we find that institutions influence social preferences. We solve two puzzles in the data: the increase and later erosion of cooperation when commoners vote against the imposition of a fine, and the high deterrence power of low fines. When fines are rejected, internalization of a social norm explains the increased cooperation; violations (accidental or not), coupled with reciprocal preferences, account for the erosion. Low fines stabilize cooperation by preventing a spiral of negative reciprocation.

fecha de publicación

  • 2006-07

Líneas de investigación

  • Common Pool Resources
  • Cooperation
  • Enforcement
  • Field Experiments
  • Regulation
  • Social Preferences


  • 2890