Asymmetrically Fair Rules for an Indivisible Good Problem with a Budget Constraint

Publicado en

  • Social Choice and Welfare


  • We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

fecha de publicación

  • 2014

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