Stable and Farsighted Set of Networks

Publicado en

  • Lecturas de Economía


  • In this paper we propose a model of network formation where the individual are farsighted. In other words, the player are able to see ahead and take decisions about changes on network structure. This characteristic means the agent's decisions that could change a network are not based on current payoffs but where they expect the process going to arrive. hence, this feature becomes the main contribution of this paper. The other hand, the formation process proposed here rest on the crucial notion of Largest Consistent Set. It one is a notion common in Social situations Theory.

fecha de publicación

  • 2005

Líneas de investigación

  • Juegos cooperativos y no cooperativos
  • Teoría de juegos y teoría de negociación

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