Equilibria under Deferred Acceptance: Dropping Strategies, Filled Positions, and Welfare

Publicado en

  • Games and Economic Behavior


  • We study many-to-one matching markets where hospitals have responsive preferences over students. We study the game induced by the student-optimal stable matching mechanism. We assume that students play their weakly dominant strategy of truth-telling.

fecha de publicación

  • 2013

Líneas de investigación

  • Deferred Acceptance
  • Dropping Strategies
  • Filled Positions
  • Many-to-One Matching
  • Nash Equilibrium
  • Welfare

Identificador de objeto digital (DOI)

  • https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.10.001

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