Collective Versus Individual Decision-Making: A Case Study of the Bank of Israel Law

Publicado en

  • European Economic Review


  • The new Bank of Israel Law of 2010 changed monetary policy decision-making at the Bank of Israel from a setup where decisions are taken by the governor to one where decisions are taken by a committee of voting members. We use this institutional change as a natural experiment to compare individual versus collective decision-making. Empirical results show different dynamics for interest rate decisions across the two regimes and support the view that the status quo bias is larger when decisions are taken by a committee than when they are taken by a single individual.

fecha de publicación

  • 2017

Enfoque geográfico

Líneas de investigación

  • Committees
  • Political Economy of Central Banking
  • Voting Models

Página inicial

  • 73

Última página

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